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Abstract
 We examine the effect of the asset price bubble in the 1980s on 
firms’ fixed investment and liquidity constraints using manufacturing panel 
data. In particular, we try to identify the effect of asset price inflation and 
the monetary easing policy on firms’ liquidity constraints. The findings are 
twofold. First, an asset price bubble decreases firms’ liquidity constraints 
and promotes fixed investment regardless of firm size. Specifically, the 
effect is greater for large firms than for small firms. Second, the monetary 
easing policy decreases the liquidity constraint of small firms during asset 
price inflation.
Keywords
        Asset price bubble, Liquidity constraint, Corporate investment
１．Introduction
 How non-fundamental valuations or bubbles affect corporate 
investment and liquidity constraints has been a long-standing issue. 
According to Stein (1996), firms increase investment when their stock price 
is overvalued and decrease investment when it is undervalued. In addition, 
firms with more collateral assets do not tend to face liquidity constraints 
and have easy access to external finance. In contrast, firms with less 
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collateral assets tend to suffer from liquidity constraints, and do not have 
many sources of external funding. However, during periods of asset price 
inflation, even firms holding relatively fewer collateral assets raise external 
funds with relative ease. We investigate the differential reaction to the 
asset price bubble by firm size.
 During the Japanese bubble years from the late 1980s to the 
early 1990s, stock and land prices witnessed drastic boom-and-bust cycles. 
Likewise, real investment swiftly increased when asset prices soared and 
decreased when they collapsed. During asset price inflation, collateral 
values increase and firms raise external funding through the capital 
market or borrow funds from banks. Firms then use external funds for real 
investment. Many empirical works have studied asset price inflation or 
bubbles, but the effect of bubbles on real investment or liquidity constraints 
has not been adequately examined.１ 
 Chirinko and Schaller (2001) examined the existence of bubbles 
and the shock of bubbles on Japanese business investment. They found that 
the bubble increased business investment by approximately 6-9%. Only 
Chirinko and Schaller (2001) directly investigated the effect of bubbles on 
firm fixed investment. However, they have not clarified whether bubbles 
influence liquidity constraints.
 Goyal and Yamada (2004) explored how asset price inflation affects 
corporate investment and external finance costs during the asset price 
bubble in Japan from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. Goyal and Yamada 
(2004) found that liquidity constraints decrease and corporate investments 
increase during a bubble. However, their estimation results, based on cross-
１ Nemoto (2017) and Hu and Oxley (2018) are recent works on the Japanese bubble 
in the 1980s.
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sectional data, may face omitted-variable problems. In addition, since the 
sample size markedly differs by estimation period, the relationship between 
firm fixed investment and liquidity constraints during the bubble might 
not have been correctly captured. To clarify these problems, we use a panel 
data set of Japanese manufacturing companies and estimate a Tobin’s 
q-type function according to firm size.
 Here, we briefly summarize the main results of our study. 
First, regardless of firm size, the asset price bubble decreases liquidity 
constraints. The result suggests that firms with collateral assets, whose 
value increased during asset price inflation, were able to raise external 
funding. In particular, the larger the firm, the greater is the effect of the 
bubble on the liquidity constraint. Large firms with more collateral assets 
originally have greater access to external funding. Evidence indicates that 
they additionally increased external finance during asset price inflation. 
Second, a monetary easing policy decreases the liquidity constraints of 
small firms during asset price inflation.
 This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we construct a 
panel dataset and define the firm size classes. In section 3, we present the 
dummy variable for the bubble, as well as independent and dependent 
variables. Section 4 reports the estimation results of the effect of bubbles on 
liquidity constraints. In section 5, we investigate whether monetary easing 
affects firms’ liquidity constraints during asset price inflation. Section 6 
presents our conclusions.
２．Data
　2. 1.  Construction of panel data
 The panel data set consists of firm data from the Nikkei NEEDS 
千葉経済論叢　第62号
－92－
Financial Quest database, with the sample period ranging from 1978 to 
1994. The estimation period starts from 1979 because lagged variables 
were included. The firms, numbering 798, belong to the manufacturing 
industry. They are listed in the first and second sections of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange. However, the panel data set is unbalanced for two reasons. First, 
some firms were delisted during the sample period. Second, two firms were 
consolidated into a single firm through a merger and acquisition.
　2. 2.  Firm size classification
 According to Bernanke and Gertler (1995), firms with more net 
worth (e.g., collateral assets) do not suffer from liquidity constraints. In 
short, a better financial position facilitates raising external funds. On the 
other hand, firms with less net worth struggle to raise external finance. 
Generally, large firms hold more collateral assets than small firms. 
Therefore, responses to financial shocks, such as asset price inflation, would 
probably differ according to firm size.
 We then divide the sample into two groups based on total assets 
to examine the differential response to asset price inflation by firm size. 
We use the median, not the mean, to classify the firms into two categories. 
Firms with total assets more than the median are defined as large firms, 
whereas those with total assets less than the median are regarded as small 
firms.
３．Specifications of variables
　3. 1.  Dummy variable of bubble
 Goyal and Yamada (2004) discuss asset inflation in detail to 
identify the effect of bubbles from other financial factors. They divide the 
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asset variation phase in Japan, 1981-1994, into four periods. The first is 
the pre-asset inflation period (1981-1986), when the Tokyo Stock Price 
Index (TOPIX) and the land price index increased gradually. The second is 
the soaring asset inflation period (1987-1990), when prices in the Japanese 
asset markets soared. The third is the asset price collapse period (1991), 
when stock and land prices dropped suddenly and drastically. The fourth is 
the contraction period (1992-1994), when the Japanese economy contracted 
with deflation of asset prices. We focus on the asset inflation period (1987-
1990) based on the above details, and our estimation model includes a 
dummy variable for 1987-1990 (the bubble period).
 Now, we need to point out an important fact. Bank of Japan (BOJ) 
conducts an expansionary monetary policy during asset price inflation. In a 
historical narrative of the monetary policy of BOJ, Kuroki (1999) identifies 
January 1986 to April 1989 as an easy monetary policy period. Therefore, 
in section 5, we try to distinguish the effect of the bubble from that of the 
expansionary monetary policy.
　3. 2.  Variables
 Following Masuda (2015), we employ Tobin’s q type investment 
function as our baseline model, using the firms liquid assets as a proxy for 
net worth.２  Based on Suzuki (2001), Hosono and Watanabe (2002), and 
Masuda (2015), we construct the following variables: investment spending 
２ Fazzari et al. (1988), Goyal and Yamada (2004), and Angelopoulou and Gibson 
(2009), among others, used cash flow. However, we used liquid assets because the 
measurement error is relatively low, as Hosono and Watanabe (2002) point out. 




(I/K), Tobin’s q (q), and the liquid asset ratio (LIQ).
 I t : real investment. The nominal investment is divided by the price 
of capital goods (PKt ) to construct the real investment variable for each 
of the following asset categories: building and structures, machinery and 
equipment, and transportation equipment. The total real investment is the 
sum of the real investments calculated by category.
 K t : real capital stock. We use the perpetual inventory method 
for each asset and treat the capital value of the 1978 fiscal year as the 
standard.３  Therefore, we apply this method to funded firms after 1979. Kt 
is excluded if it is negative in the calculation.
 q : Tobin’s q. Tobin’s q is calculated as follows: market value of 
equity plus total debt minus liquid assets minus intangible fixed assets 
minus the book values of other assets, all scaled by the replacement value 
of capital stock.４ 
 LIQ: liquid assets ratio. The liquid assets ratio is defined as the 
ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Liquid assets consist of cash deposits, 
accounts receivable, and securities.
 Table 1 shows the summary statistics of investment, Tobin’s q, and 
the liquid assets ratio. The variation in the annual cross-sectional average 
of Tobin’s q reflects stock prices during the period 1978-1994. As asset 
inflation soared from 1987 to 1990, Tobin’s q increased from 4.1162 in the 
mid-1980s to 5.4548 in the late 1980s. The decline in Tobin’s q in the early 
1990s mirrors the asset price collapse. On the other hand, in contrast to 
３ The depreciation rate for each asset is follows: 0.047 for buildings and structures, 
0.09489 for machinery and equipment, and 0.147 for transportation equipment.
４ Tobin’s q is constructed according to Hosono and Watanabe (2002, appendix). 
Please refer to them for details.
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Tobin’s q, investments and the liquid assets ratio (cross-sectional averages) 
barely changed from the middle of the 1980s to the early 1990s.
４．Estimation
　4. 1.  Baseline model
 This section examines whether an asset price bubble has a 









mean s. d. mean s. d. mean s. d.
1978 0.1715 0.1181 3.6318 2.7788 0.4643 0.1143
1979 0.1740 0.1219 3.2003 2.5974 0.4730 0.1118
1980 0.1661 0.1072 2.9284 2.5455 0.4699 0.1090
1981 0.1769 0.1132 2.4185 2.2173 0.4621 0.1123
1982 0.1673 0.1102 2.6376 2.3210 0.4655 0.1129
1983 0.1583 0.1085 3.1770 2.6895 0.4645 0.1137
1984 0.1497 0.1034 3.3601 2.6026 0.4767 0.1146
1985 0.1647 0.1129 3.7621 2.6206 0.4759 0.1125
1986 0.1574 0.1040 4.1162 2.6295 0.4653 0.1140
1987 0.1337 0.0921 4.6880 2.6854 0.4760 0.1167
1988 0.1190 0.0814 5.5731 2.9364 0.4906 0.1162
1989 0.1352 0.0902 5.4548 2.9435 0.4932 0.1150
1990 0.1557 0.0994 4.4805 2.7039 0.4918 0.1186
1991 0.1677 0.1003 3.2338 2.1950 0.4713 0.1176
1992 0.1552 0.1010 3.0540 2.0554 0.4391 0.1191
1993 0.1175 0.0800 2.9243 1.8800 0.4288 0.1204
1994 0.0884 0.0695 2.4997 1.6831 0.4290 0.1232
Table1. Summary Statistics
Note: This table reports means and standard deviation of the real investment-






changes according to firm size. For that purpose, the cross-term of the 
liquidity assets ratio and the bubble dummy are added to Tobin’s q 
investment function. The explanatory variables take one-year-lagged 
values to avoid simultaneous equation bias. According to the Hausman 
specification test results, we adopt the fixed effects model. We estimate 
regression model (1) using the least-squares dummy variable method:
 
 where subscripts i and t stand for firm i in year t, I/K for the ratio 
of real investment to the real capital stock, q for Tobin’s q, LIQ for the liquid 
assets ratio, bubble for the bubble dummy, f for the individual firm fixed 
effects, υ for year fixed effects, and ε for the disturbance term.
 As mentioned in section 3, we introduce the liquid assets ratio 
instead of cash flow into our model. According to Masuda (2015), a 
contractionary monetary policy tends to affect firms with less liquid assets 
more than those with more liquid assets. In short, firms with less liquid 
assets face severe liquidity constraints from an adverse monetary policy 
and struggle to raise external financing. Firms with more liquid assets 
faced lower liquidity constraints during 2001-2006, a quantitative monetary 
easing policy period.
 Therefore, the relationship between the liquidity constraint of 
firms and the asset price bubble is considered to follow the same pattern; 
investments should be less sensitive to liquid assets during bubble period. 
If so, the coefficient of LIQ should be significantly positive (i.e.,α２＞0), and 
that of LIQ × Bubble significantly negative (i.e.,α３＜0), statistically.
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　4. 2.  Estimation results
 Table 2 shows the estimation results of equation (1). All the 
coefficients of the independent variable are highly significant statistically, 
and the signs of the coefficients of LIQ and LIQ×Bubble are as predicted in 
section 4.1. Columns (3) and (5) show the coefficients of LIQ for small and 
large firms, respectively—both significantly positive. The coefficient of LIQ 
for small firms in column (3) is 0.1740, and that of LIQ for large firms in 
column (5) is 0.1555. These results suggest that small firms normally face 
more liquidity constraints than large firms.
 Columns (4) and (6) respectively present the coefficients of cross-
terms for small and large firms, at -0.0163 and -0.0572. The estimation 
results imply that investment is less sensitive to the liquid assets ratio for 
large firms compared to small firms during asset price inflation (small firms 
(α２+α３=0.1644)＞large firms (α２+α３=0.1297)). That is, compared to small 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
q 0.0070*** 0.0071*** 0.0048*** 0.0053*** 0.0066*** 0.0082***
(11.440) (11.645) (6.3027) (6.5228) (7.8902) (9.4836)
LIQ 0.1805*** 0.1934*** 0.1740*** 0.1807*** 0.1555*** 0.1869***
(11.354) (11.562) (8.2608) (8.5147) (6.3489) (7.7342)
LIQ × Bubble −0.0456*** −0.0163** −0.0572***
(−3.0488) (−2.1229) (−7.2060)
Adjusted R-squared 0.2107 0.2112 0.1947 0.1949 0.1972 0.2007
No. of Observations 11736 11736 11736 11736 11736 11736
No. of Firms 798 798 399 399 399 399
Notes: 1. *** and ** denote 1% and 5% significance level, respectively. 2. t-statistics in parenthesis are
computed on the basis of White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Table2. Estimation results of baseline model (1)
All Firms Small Firms Large FirmsIndependent Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
q 0.0070*** 0.0070*** 0.0048*** 0.0048*** 0.0066*** 0.0065***
(11.440) (11.037) (6.3027) (6.1325) (7.8902) (7.8098)
LIQ 0.1805*** 0.1807*** 0.1740*** 0.1757*** 0.1555*** 0.1554***
(11.354) (10.960) (8.2608) (8.0524) (6.3489) (6.3444)
LIQ × MEP −0.0237 −0.1205** 0.0704
(−0.4674) (−2.5079) (1.4539)
Adjusted R-squared 0.2107 0.2106 0.1947 0.1951 0.1972 0.1972
No. of Observations 11736 11736 11736 11736 11736 11736
No. of Firms 798 798 399 399 399 399
Notes: 1. *** and ** denote 1% and 5% significance level, respectively. 2. t-statistics in parenthesis are
computed on the basis of White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Table3. Estimation results of model (4) exluding the cross term of LIQ × bubble
Independent Variables All Firms Small Firms Large Firms
千葉経済論叢　第62号
－98－
５. The effect of monetary easing in the bubble period
　5. 1.  Dummy variable of monetary easing
 This subsection examines whether an expansionary monetary 
policy influences firms’ liquidity constraints during an asset price bubble. As 
mentioned in section 3.1, BOJ implemented a monetary easing policy from 
January 1986 to April 1989. Since the policy was implemented during the 
asset price inflation period (1987-1990), we need to identify the effects of 
both. Thus, we construct a dummy variable for the monetary easing policy, 
following Masuda (2015), and introduce the dummy into our estimation 
model. In line with Kuroki (1999), the dummy variable takes the value 1 for 
each month of monetary easing, and 0 for other months.
 
 Subscripts j and t denote month j and year t. To combine the 
monthly dummy to annual firm-level data, we average this variable over 
the firm’s fiscal year t and obtain the dummy for MEP as follows.
 
 MEPit stands for the average monthly dummy of monetary easing 
policy for firm i in year t. This average dummy variable takes values 
between 0 and 1, according to the number of months in which the monetary 
easing policy was implemented in the firm’s fiscal year t. Tit denotes a set 
of month-year observations for firm i's fiscal year t. The interaction term of 
LIQ and MEP is introduced into our estimation model, as presented below:
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 If investments become less sensitive to the liquid assets ratio with 
the monetary easing policy, the coefficient of LIQ×MEP is expected to be 
significantly negative (i.e., α４＜0).
　5. 2.  Results
 Table 3 reports the estimation results of model (4), excluding the 
cross-term LIQ×Bubble. As presented in column (4), the coefficient of LIQ×
MEP for small firms is significantly negative and their liquidity constraint 
decreases (α２+α４= 0.0052). However, the coefficient of the cross-term for 
large firms shown in column (6) is not as expected. 
 Table 4 shows the estimation results of regression model (4). 
The coefficients of LIQ×Bubble and LIQ×MEP are presented in column (4) 










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
q 0.0070*** 0.0071*** 0.0048*** 0.0053*** 0.0066*** 0.0082***
(11.440) (11.645) (6.3027) (6.5228) (7.8902) (9.4836)
LIQ 0.1805*** 0.1934*** 0.1740*** 0.1807*** 0.1555*** 0.1869***
(11.354) (11.562) (8.2608) (8.5147) (6.3489) (7.7342)
LIQ × Bubble −0.0456*** −0.0163** −0.0572***
(−3.0488) (−2.1229) (−7.2060)
Adjusted R-squared 0.2107 0.2112 0.1947 0.1949 0.1972 0.2007
No. of Observations 11736 11736 11736 11736 11736 11736
No. of Firms 798 798 399 399 399 399
Notes: 1. *** and ** denote 1% and 5% significance level, respectively. 2. t-stati tics i parenth sis are
computed on the basis of White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Table2. Estimation results of baseline model (1)
All Firms Small Firms Large FirmsIndependent Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
q 0.0070*** 0.0070*** 0.0048*** 0.0048*** 0.0066*** 0.0065***
(11.440) (11.037) (6.3027) (6.1325) (7.8902) (7.8098)
LIQ 0.1805*** 0.1807*** 0.1740*** 0.1757*** 0.1555*** 0.1554***
(11.354) (10.960) (8.2608) (8.0524) (6.3489) (6.3444)
LIQ × MEP −0.0237 −0.1205** 0.0704
(−0.4674) (−2.5079) (1.4539)
Adjusted R-squared 0.2107 0.2106 0.1947 0.1951 0.1972 0.1972
No. of Observations 11736 11736 11736 11736 11736 11736
No. of Firms 798 798 399 399 399 399
Notes: 1. *** and ** denote 1% and 5% significance level, respectively. 2. t-statistics in parenthesis are
computed on the basis of White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Table3. Estimation results of model (4) exluding the cross term of LIQ × bubble
Independent Variables All Firms Small Firms Large Firms
千葉経済論叢　第62号
－100－
coefficients of LIQ×Bubble and LIQ×MEP for small firms are significantly 
negative.５  Therefore, the monetary easing policy and asset price inflation 
influence the liquidity constraint of small firms (α２＋α３＋α４=0.0566). However, 
the expansionary monetary policy does not affect the sensitivity of the 
investment to the liquid assets ratio for large firms, as shown in column 
(6). From these results, we conclude that asset price inflation has a much 
greater effect on large firms than monetary easing. 
６． Conclusions
 We examine whether firms’ liquidity constraints decrease 
investment and spending during the asset price inflation period in Japan 
from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s. This study presents two 
５ We used a Wald test to test the null hypothesis that these two coefficients are equal 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
q 0.0071*** 0.0071*** 0.0053*** 0.0053*** 0.0082*** 0.0082***
(11.645) (11.646) (6.5228) (6.4974) (9.4836) (9.0993)
LIQ 0.1934*** 0.1935*** 0.1807*** 0.1815*** 0.1869*** 0.188***
(11.562) (11.565) (8.5147) (8.5562) (7.7342) (7.5038)
LIQ × Bubble −0.0456*** −0.0454*** −0.0163** −0.0143* −0.0572*** −0.0594***
(−3.0488) (−3.0309) (−2.1229) (−1.8415) (−7.206) (−7.1608)
LIQ ×MEP −0.015108 −0.1106** 0.1154
(−0.3089) (−2.3661) (2.3481)
Adjusted R-squared 0.2112 0.2112 0.1949 0.1952 0.2007 0.2010
No. of Observations 11736 11736 11736 11736 11736 11736
No. of Firms 798 798 399 399 399 399
Notes: 1. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 2. t-statistics in parenthesis
are computed on the basis of White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 3. We used Wald test to
test whether the coefficients of LIQ × Bubble and LIQ ×MEP in Column (4) are equal: H0 : α3 = α4, H1 : α 3
≠α 4, and the null hypothesis was rejected at 5% significance level: χ2 (1) = 3.9648, probability > χ2 = 0.0465.
Large Firms
Table4. Estimation results of model (4)
Independent Variables All Firms Small Firms
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findings. First, as expected, the asset price bubble decreases the liquidity 
constraints of firms and stimulates their fixed investment. In particular, 
this effect is stronger for large firms than for small firms. Second, the 
liquidity constraints of small firms decrease not only because of asset 
price inflation but also because of the monetary easing policy during the 
bubble period (1987-1990). Large firms with more liquid assets hold a 
larger amount of collateral assets than small firms with less liquid assets. 
Therefore, the collateral value of large firms soars during asset price 
inflation, and they easily raise external finance without being affected by 
monetary easing.
 Finally, we mention an issue that is yet to be examined. According 
to Kuroki (1999), while the asset inflation bubble collapsed in 1991, the 
contractionary monetary policy was implemented from May 1989 to June 
1991. Thus, in future research, we need to investigate what influenced 
firms’ behavior in the early 1990s—the collapse of asset inflation or the 
contractionary monetary policy.
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